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RECENT DECISIONS
In the instant case, under the rationale of the dissent, it would appear
that the three factors considered heretofore are present. The source of
the income, i.e., the act which generates it, was the entry of the taxpayer
into the contest. Control over the source of the income is found in the tax-
payer's designation of income to his daughter. Finally, the taxpayer re-
ceived economic worth by designating his daughter as the person to receive
the income.
However, the rationale of the dissent fails when the Horst case is read
in connection with Poe v. Seaborn.' In the Seaborn case Mr. Justice Rob-
erts stated that "The very assignment in that case (referring to the Earl
decision) was bottomed on the fact that the earnings would be the hus-
band's property else there would have been nothing on which it could
operate."' This qualification of the Earl case was more explicitly stated
in Helvering v. Horst where Mr. Justice Stone, writing for the majority,
said that:'
[T]he rule that income is not taxable until realized has never been
taken to mean that the taxpayer . . . who has fully enjoyed the
benefit of the economic gain represented by his right to receive in-
came, can escape taxation because he has not himself received pay-
ment of it from his obligor. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is submitted that the majority is correct in its conclusion that a tax-
payer must have a right to receive income which he generates before he can
be taxed upon it. If a taxpayer has no right to receive the income, he does
not have sufficient control over it to justify taxing him. He could in no
way use the income for his own economic benefit. Further, this position
will not deprive the United States of revenue inasmuch as someone will be
taxed upon the income in such situations. Under the facts in the instant
case, it would appear that the daughter is taxable on the income which she
received."
HARRY A. HAINES
FAILURE TO APPEAL FROM REVERSAL OF VARIANCE GRANTED FOR NON-
CONFORMING USE UNDER ZONING ACT PRECLUDES CLAIM OF AGRICULTURAL
ExEMPTION.-Pursuant to the Montana County Planning and Zoning Act,'
defendant and other landowners signed a zoning petition giving the Board
of County Commissioners authority to creat a zoning district. The district
' Supra note 10.
'Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117 (1930).
'Supra note 6 at 116.
MThe daughter does not come within the exception of section 74 of the INT. REv. CODE.
The exception in that section allows Nobel prize winners and Pulitzer prize winners
tax free income. See, H. Rept., No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 11, A27 (1954) ;
S. Rept., No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 13, 179 (1954). Although the daughter
falls within a different income bracket than another with higher income, In theory
the United States is not deprived of the revenue.
REvISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 16-4101 to 4107. Hereinafter REVIsED COES
OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.
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was established and zoned as residential; however, the ordinances pertain-
ing to the district also permitted agricultural uses. At the time the district
was established, defendant was operating an auto repair shop and grazing
horses on his land. Three years thereafter, defendant petitioned the Board
of County Commissioners for a variance from the district ordinances to
allow him to construct a garage for his repair business. The Board of
County Commissioners granted defendant's petition. Plaintiffs, other
landowners within the district, notified defendant that they were, appealing
the Board's decision to the district court.' Defendant erected the building
pending the filing of the appeal. The district court reversed the board,
thus denying the variance. Defendant failed to appeal, but began using
the building solely for agricultural purposes. Plaintiffs then petitioned
the district court for a mandatory injunction to force removal of the
building. On the basis of a decision of another district court that the
County Planning and Zoning Act was unconstitutional, the district court
ruled that the question was moot. The Montana Supreme Court reversed
and remanded both cases, holding that the Act was constitutional.' On re-
mand, the district court held that since defendant's lands were being used
for grazing, they were exempt from the district ordinances inasmuch as
the County Planning and Zoning Act states that zoning districts shall not
regulate grazing and agricultural lands.' Upon rehearing to the Montana
Supreme Court, held, reversed. A determination of defendant's right to
claim the agricultural exemption from the County Planning and Zoning
Act was inherent in the reversal of the variance, and that determination
is now res judicata. Doull v. Wohlschlager, 377 P.2d 758 (Mont. 1963)
(Mr. Justice Doyle dissented on other grounds.' Mr. Justice Adair dis-
sented without opinion).
Montana's County Planning and Zoning Act, with its exemption of
agricultural lands from regulation by zoning authorities, is not unique
legislation.! The purpose of zoning legislation is generally stated by the
enabling statutes in terms of furthering the public health, safety, and
welfare.' The court in the instant case noted that one of the primary func-
tions of the County Planning and Zoning Act is to promote the orderly
and planned expansion of municipalities.' This interpretation is con-
sistent with the view that an essential purpose of zoning laws is to sta-
bilize property uses.' An examination of the construction to be given the
'R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4105 provides in part, ". . . (A)ny person aggrieved by any deci-
sion of the commission or the board of county commissioners, may, within thirty
(30) days after such decision or order, appeal to the district court in the county
in which the property involved, 'is located."
'City of Missoula v. Missoula County, 139 Mont. 256, 362 P.2d 539 (1961).
'R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4102 provides in part, "No planning district r recommendations
adopted under this Act shall regulate lands used for grazing, horticulture, agricul-
ture or for the growing of timber."
5Mr. Justice Doyle based his dissent on the fact that defendant had constructed the
building in the two days interval after the granting of the variance and before the
filing of the appeal with the district court.
6 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 31-3803 to 3804 (1961) ; N.D. CENTRaY CoDE ANN.
§§ 11-83-01 to 20; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-289.1 to .9 (1961).
'Ib 4.
9Instant case at 763.
:*Smith v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 142 Conn. Supp. 88, 111 A.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
SchmIdt v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Newark, 9 N.J. 405, 88 A.2d 607 (1952).
[Vol. 24,
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exemption of agricultural lands from zoning regulation must be pursued
with these purposes in mind.
The court in the instant case stated that inasmuch as the County
Planning and Zoning Act does not distinguish agricultural lands from
those used for other purposes in defining the physical area of districts,
agricultural lands can be included in county zoning districts.' If a zon-
ing district is established so that it surrounds agricultural land, to say
that such land cannot be included in zoning districts would lead to the
conclusion that a later use of the land for purposes foreign to agriculture
would not be subject to the district regulations. This would defeat any
stabilization of uses that the regulations had accomplished.'
Once it is established that agricultural lands can be included in zoning
districts, the treatment which the legislature intended to be given such
lands must be determined.
Property uses within zoning districts are generally classified in one
of four basic property-use categories; as either permitted uses, noncon-
forming uses, variances, or exceptions."
Permitted uses are the specified permissible uses of land within the
zoning district.' Such uses need not be in existence at the time the ordi-
nance is adopted, and the only prerequisite to the construction of build-
ings in conjunction with such uses is the issuance of a permit by the
County Planning and Zoning Commission." The district ordinance in-
volved in the instant case enumerates in detail eleven uses which can be
lawfully conducted within the district, and it will be noted that agriculture
is among them. These eleven uses are "specifically permitted" by the
zoning ordinance."
While technically any use which does not comply with the zoning regu-
lations is a nonconforming use, courts have used this term to designate
those uses in existence when the zoning district was created." The County
Planning and Zoning Act provides, as do other zoning enabling statutes,'
that nonconforming uses may be continued after the zoning district is estab-
lished.' In compliance with the County Planning and Zoning Act, the
ordinance in the instant case provides that nonconforming uses may be
continued, and also provides a two-year grace period during which the
nonconforming use may be abandoned without losing the right to con-
tinue such use."
,6Supra note 8.
nFor example, if a 10 acre corn field was located within a 40 acre zoning district
which had been zoned residential, and the 10 acres were later used as the site of a
factory, the purposes for which the district had been established would be defeated.
'
2Tustin Heights Ass'n. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 107 Cal. App. 2d 617, 339 P.2d 914, 919(Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
'Ibid. See, e.g., instant case at 764.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4105.
'Instant case at 764-65.
"See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs of County of Sarpy v. Petsch, 172 Neb. 263, 109
N.W.2d 388, 391 (1961).
"Supra note 6.
'R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4102.
"Missoula County, Mont., County Planning and Zoning District Number One, Ordi-
nance 3, May 16, 1955. Instant case at 765.
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Variances, the third property-use category, embrace uses which were
not in existence when the zoning district was established, and which are
not permitted by the zoning ordinances. The Board of County Commis-
sioners may grant a variance from the district ordinances in order to al-
low a particular use not in existence when the zoning district was created,
if a strict enforcement of the ordinances would work unnecessary hard-
ship on the landowner, and such use would not be contrary to the public
interest.' The granting of variances lies within the discretion of the
Board. This discretion is necessarily broad and unrestricted as the legis-
lature cannot frame a definite rule to cover every case of hardship."
The fourth property-use category is composed of "exceptions" or
"conditional uses." An exception differs from a variance in that :
In the case of an exception, the [zoning] law itself has forseen
the possibility that a departure from its provisions may be desir-
able if certain specified facts or circumstances are found to exist.
A variance, on the other hand, involves an overriding of the law
itself, based upon a finding that the law as written would inflict
unnecessary hardship on the property owner.
It is apparent that if agriculture is classified as a permitted use,
agricultural operations could be instituted within a zoning district at
any time, subject to the issuance of a building permit by the Planning
and Zoning Commission for the construction of buildings to be used in
conjunction with the agricultural use.
If agriculture is classified as a nonconforming use, several policy
questions are presented concerning technical changes in agricultural opera-
tions. For example, when a wheat farmer determines that his land would
return a higher yield by using it to raise livestock, can he erect a barn
on the land if the land was used for wheat raising when the district was
created? Or, can a dairy farmer construct barns to expand his operations
on land where there were no barns when the zoning ordinances were en-
cated ?
Even though one purpose of zoning is to eventually eliminate non-
conforming uses by restricting their expansion, it is recognized that
when a change in a nonconforming use is sought, the determinative ques-
tion is, " (W) hether the change is reasonably required to preserve the
original right [to continue nonconforming use], or would [such change]
create some new or additional right, exercise of which would be detir-
mental to the public or other property owners."" Courts in other states
have impliedly recognied that the wide diversity of uses inherent in the
general field of agricultural will not allow the application of standard
variance requirements, and have liberally granted variances to allow the
expansion or adoption of the facet of agriculture which the individual
-R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4103.
"Freeman v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Great Falls 97 Mont. 342i 34 P.2d 534
(1934).
'These terms are used interchangeably by the courts.
"Application of Emmett S. Hickman Co., 49 Del. 13, 108 A.2d 667, 673 (1964). As
the Montana County Planning and Zoning Act does not provide for the granting
of exceptions, no further mention of them will herein be made.
'Ricciardi v. Los Angeles County, 115 Cal. App. 2d 569, 252 P.2d 773, 778 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1953).
[Vol. 24,
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farmer has determined is best suited to his land.' The right to continue
the nonconforming agricultural use is preserved by allowing changes with-
in a broad definition of "agriculture.'" The Montana Supreme Court
has given the term "agriculture" a broad definition in respect to Mon-
tana's homestead laws.' A similar treatment of the term could easily be
applied to the County Planning and Zoning Act if it is recognized that
Montana's farmers should not be hindered be zoning regulations in at-
tempting to realize the maximum agricultural potential of their land.
The provisions of the County Planning and Zoning Act do not in
themselves disclose whether the legislature intended that agriculture be
placed in a specific use category. No mention is made of agriculture in
the purpose of the Act as stated by the legislature." and the exemption
itself provides no clue to legislative intent.
However, following the adoption of the County Planning and Zoning
Act, the City-County Master-Plan Act,' a more comprehensive plan for
land use control through the joint efforts of Montana's cities and coun-
ties, was enacted. The Master-Plan Act is indicative of the legislature's
recognition of the needs of agriculture in respect to zoning legislation.
Even though the Montana Supreme Court has ruled the Master-Plan Act
to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers to counties,'
this does not render an examination of it futile in determining legislative
policies concerning agricultural lands with respect to zoning laws.
The purpose of the City-County Master-Plan Act was stated to be,
"(T)o encourage local units of government . . . to plan for the future
development of their communities to the end that . . . the needs of agri-
culture . ..be recognized in future growth.""
The legislative limitations of the City-County Master-Plan Act pro-
vided that, "Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to authorize an ordinance,
resolution, rule, or regulation which would prevent the complete use, de.
velopment, or recovery of any mineral, forest, or agricultural resources by
the owner thereof.'' (Emphasis supplied.)
The agricultural exemption contained in the City-County Master-
Plan Act does not differ in substance from the County Planning and Zon-
UStout v. Mitschele, 135 N.J.L. 406, 52 A.2d 422 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Moulton v. Bldg.
Inspector of Milton, 312 Mass. 195, 43 N.E.2d 662 (1942).
mlbd.
2Agriculture was defined by the court to be, "(T)he art or science of cultivating
the ground, especlally in fields or in large quantities, including the preparation of
the soil, the planting of seeds, the raising and harvesting of crops, and the rearing,
feeding, and management of livestock; tillage; husbandry; farming." De Fon-
tenay v. Childs, 93 Mont. 480, 19 P.2d 650, 651 (1923).
'
8R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4102 mentions only the furtherance of the health, safety, and
general welfare of the county's residents.
'*Supra note 4.
mR.C.M. 1947, §§ 11-3801 to 3858, as amended.
"Plath v. Hi-Ball Contractors, Inc., 139 Mont. 263, 362 P.2d 1021 (1961). IRO.M.
1947, § 11-3801 provides in part "(T)hat additional powers be granted legislative
bodies of cities and counties to carry out the purposes of this Act." The court
stated that the legislature intended, by these words, to grant legislative powers to
counties, and therefore the At was unconstitutional.
O'Baird v. Hutchinson, 179 Ill. App. 435, 53 N.E. 567 (1895).
mR.C.M. 1947, § 11-3801.
"R.C.M. 1947, § 11-3853, as amended.
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ing Act exemption, but is only a more explicit statement of legislative policy
concerning the conservation of agricultural lands within zoning districts.
That is, zoning ordinances are not to regulate' agricultural uses either by
prohibiting such uses entirely, or by allowing only certain specified agri-
cultural uses. Thus, the agricultural exemption is a statutory guarantee
that Montana's farmers and ranchers will not be denied the right to de-
velop their land to its fullest potential.
The Montana court has recognized that the legislature intended the
agricultural exemption to serve as a guideline" for zoning authorities in
adopting district ordinances. This guideline is complied with so long as
agriculture is not prohibited either wholly or in part by the ordinances.
Therefore, the treatment to be given agricultural uses should be left to the
discretion of the county planning and zoning board and the board of
county commissioners. In characterizing agriculture as either a noncon-
forming use or a permitted use, the zoning authorities will have to balance
the interests of agricultural land owners and the interest of the public in
the conservation of agricultural land against the interest of the public in
the orderly and planned expansion of urban and suburban development.
The court in the instant case stated that it was unnecessary to pass
upon the construction to be given the agricultural exemption. It felt that
a determination of defendant's right to claim the exemption was inherent
in the district court's reversal of the variance granted by the Board, and
that that determination is now res judicata.' However, it will be remem-
bered that the variance had been granted for a commercial and not for an
agricultural use.
It is difficult to follow the reasoning of the court in reaching its con-
clusion, for the testimony the court cited in support of the reversal of the
variance" was taken at the trial concerning the mandatory injunction.*
Also, it is submitted that the court incorrectly applied the doctrine of res
judicata to defendant's claim of the agricultural exemption.
The Montana court on prior occasions has determined the extent to
which a judgment is a bar to a subsequent action.' A distinction has been
drawn between a judgment as an absolute bar when the second action is
upon the same claim or demand, and a judgment as an estoppel as to
particular facts when the subsequent suit is upon a different claim or de-
mand." However, the only statement as to the scope of the doctrine of
res judicata which has been repeatedly used by the Montana court is that
"A judgment not appealed from is conclusive as to all issues raised by the
-R.C.M. 1947, § 16-4102 provides that district regulations shall not regulate lands
used for agricultural purposes. "'To regulate' means to adjust; to govern by
rule; to direct or manage according to certain standards or laws; to subject to
rules, restrictions or governing principles." State ex rel. State Bd. of Equalization
v. Glacier Park Co., 118 Mont. 205, 164 P.2d 366, 370 (1945).
"Supra note 3.
"Instant case at 764.
WIbid.
Transcript on Appeal, pp. 131, 139.
4"See, e.g., Missoula Ught and Water Co. v. Hughes, 106 Mont. 355, 77 P.2d 1041
(1938); Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 550, 55 P.2d 697 (1936) (and cases cited
therein).
"Brennan v. Jones, 101 Mont. 550, 55 P.2d 697, 700 (1936).
[Vol. 24,
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pleadings, actually litigated and adjudged, as shown on the face of the
judgment, and necessarily determined in order to reach the conclusion an-
nounced.'"'
If it is recognized that agriculture was a permitted use under the ordi-
nances in the instant case, and the zoning ordinance so provided, then de-
fendant's claim of the agricultural exemption should not be barred by the
doctrine of res judicata merely because the decision reversing the variance
to construct the building for a nonconforming use was not appealed.
The issue of defendant's right to claim the agricultural exemption was
not raised in the petition for review of the granting of the variance, nor in
the answer thereto," and it was not mentioned in the findings of fact or
conclusions of law made by the court in its reversal of the order of the
county commissioners granting the variance."
Further, defendant's right to claim the agricultural exemption was not
necessarily determined in order to reach the conclusion that the variance was
improperly granted. '
In a proceeding for a variance any issue as to whether, as a matter
of law, the contemplated use of a petitioner's property is forbidden
or allowed by the zone ordinance is collateral. It is neither relevant
to the question involved, nor is it within the scope of the issue prop-
erly before the board or court for decision. For implicit in every
variance proceeding is the justified assumption that the ordinance
prohibits the proposed use.
The only issue properly before zoning authorities or the courts upon
an application for a variance on the ground of unnecessary hardship is
whether from the facts presented the property owner will suffer a hard-
ship which is exceptional, special or unique when contrasted with the hard-
ship suffered by other owners in the district."
It has been stated that where an application for a variance has been
made on the erroneous assumption that the use sought is prohibited by
the zoning ordinances, and the granting of the variance is later reversed
with no appeal taken, such reversal is not res judicata when the use is later
correctly claimed as a use permitted under the ordinances." This position
follows from the types of relief a landowner may obtain in respect to per-
mitted uses.
A variance can be granted by the zoning authorities as a matter of
discretion when a building in furtherace of a permitted use is sought, but
this relief is not exclusive.' It is concurrent with the relief given by the
ordinance itself as an absolute right in the form of a permitted use, and a
denial of one form or relief will not bar the other."
"Missoula Light and Water Co. v. Hughes, 8upra note 40 at 1047.
"Transcript on Appeal, pp. 75, 77.
"Transcript on Appeal, pp. 80-85.
'Kaufman v. Glen Cove, 180 Misc. 349, 45 N.Y.S.2d 53, 62 (Sup. Ct. 1943), afpd
mem., 266 App. Div. 870, 42 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1943).
'"Ibid.
"Application of Furman Ave. Realty Corp., 275 App. Div. 731, 86 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Sup.
Ct. 1949), rev'd on other ground8 299 N.Y. 768, 87 N.E.2d 676 (1949), affirming
275 App. Div. 779, 87 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1949).
"Supra note 45.
"SRupra note 45.
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Therefore, a reversal of the variance in the first action in the instant
case should not prevent defendant from claiming the agricultural exemp-
tion, as the district ordinances specifically included agriculture as a per-
mitted use.'
The holding in the instant case thta the reversal of the variance is res
judicata as to defendant's claim of the agricultural exemption can be re-
conciled with the above reasoning only by interpreting the agricultural ex-
emption as meaning that agriculture is to be treated as a nonconforming
use within zoning districts. Viewed in this light, the holding of the court
is correct. If agriculture is a conconforming use, a variance would have
to be granted before a building could be constructed in furtherance of such
use. In that event defendant's claim of the agricultural exemption would
be barred by failure to appeal the first decision reversing the granting of
the variance.
It is submitted that the court in the instant case, in its zeal to promote
the stabilization of uses within county zoning districts, has failed to recog-
nize the intent of the legislature, as expressed by the agricultural exemp-
tion, to conserve agricultural lands. It has ignored the measure of discre-
tion to categorize agricultural uses given to county zoning authorities by
the legislature, for the ordinance in the instant case expressly categorized
agriculture as a permitted use, and finally the court has denied the right
of the county zoning authorities to adopt such a classification.
The court has set a dangerous precedent, which may result in a
judicial amortization of not only agricultural uses, but also the other
uses included in the County Planning and Zoning Act exemption clause.
KEMP J. WILSON
tSupra note 45. This also means that if defendant had originally applied for
and received a permit to construct the building in conjunction with a permitted
use and this was reversed on appeal, such reversal would not bar a later granting
of a variance by the zoning authorities. (fillis v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the
Town of Greenburgh, 27 Misc. 2d 1092, 212 N.Y.S.2d 510 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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